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of avoiding relitigation of issues, where he has been once afforded a
fair tribunal in which to try them.
Certainly, however, there is something in the nature of the cases in
which a formerly losing party was a defendant in the first suit, and the
cases in which the formerly losing party is "hauled into court" with
the issues already decided against him, that makes the courts wary of a
liberal rule of estoppel by record. Up to this point, however, it seems
that public policy in preserving peace, the desire for freedom from
vexatious litigation, and the interest in the dignity of tribunals of
justice hold sway in liberal courts where a formerly losing party tries to
sue another on issues formerly decided against him in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction. FRE BARTENSTEIN, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE PRESSURE TO INDUCE
ACCEPTANCE OF ELECTIVE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
Workmen's Compensation Acts' are now widely adopted in recog-
nition of the fact that the common law negligence action against an
employer is entirely inadequate from both a social and economic point
of view to meet the need for monetary compensation for the injuries
befalling workmen in modem industry. These acts have been passed,
therefore, to facilitate the legal procedure available to workingmen in-
jured in the course of their employment by assuring them of a speedy
and certain recovery for the injuries.
2
Although the statutes of the several states vary in many important
respects, the fundamental difference from a constitutional point of
view is whether the act be optional or compulsory. The right of a legis-
lature to impose liability upon the employer, independently of his
negligence, is no longer open to question under either type of statute.
The courts have held that the compulsory statutes, and a fortiori the
optional statutes, do not impinge upon the due process or equal protec-
tion clauses of the Constitution. Today, therefore, the legislative power
1Hereinafter referred to as "W. C. A."
2Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 489 (1911).
soptional Statutes: Deibeikis v. Link-Belt CO., 261 Ill. 454, 104 N. E. 211, Ann.
Cas. i9t 5 A, 24t (1914); Shade v. Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement CO., 93
Kan. 257, 144 Pac. 249 (1914); In re Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 6o7, 96 N. E. 308
(19 t 1). See Note, L. R. A. 19 t6A. 409. Compulsory Statutes: Western Indemnity
Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 Pac. 398 (1915); State ex rel Davis-Smith Co. v.
Clausen. 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 11ol (911), 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466 (1912).
NOTES
to create absolute liability under a compulsory W. C. A. is settled,4 and
litigation is mainly concerned with problems growing out of optional
or so-called "elective" statutes.
In every instance in which a state legislature has been content to
adopt an elective statute, it has been found that its provisions were not
sufficiently attractive to the employers within the jurisdiction to enlist
their unanimous adherence. Methods of making the employers who
took advantage of their statutory right to elect not to come under the
compensation system, see the "desirability" of a change of mind became
necessary to eradicate the evils that a W. C. A. is designed to eliminate.
These methods have taken three forms: (L) Abolition of the em.
ployer's common law defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule; (2) Imposition of pre-
sumptions of negligence against the employer; (3) Creation of rules of
evidence designed to facilitate the proof of the injured employee's case.
A. Abolition of Common Law Defenses
The first persuasive legislative device was that of the abolition of
the common law defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary as-
sumption of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine as to employers who
refused to enlist. The power to abolish these defenses rests upon the
principle that no person has any property right or vested interest in
any rule of law, and that the legislature may change such rules if they
deem it best for the good of the state.5 It has been held that to do so as
a means of compelling employers to accept the provisions of the act is
not unreasonable coercion, 6 but merely a declaration of the public
policy of the state.7 Legislative action of this character has been uni-
formly upheld,s but standing alone has lacked the vigor of a compell-
ing force. Resort to additional means became necessary.
'This is true unless, of course, a peculiar state constitutional prohibition is
contravened, it being settled that the Federal Constitution has no applicable
measures.
"In re Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 3o8 ('9"); Matheson v.
Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 126 Minn, 286, 148 N. W. 71 (1914); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147
Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 489 (1911).
'Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co., 175 Iowa 245, 154 N. W. 1037 (1915);
Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 489 (1911).
7Appeal of Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143, 93 Ad. 245 (1915).
'This method of coercion is well sanctioned as being constitutional. The cases
are collected in Note, L. R. A. i9i6A, 409, 413.
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B. Imposition of Negligence Presumptions
In legal effect there is no difference between saying that for acci-
dental injuries received by a workman is the course of his employment,
and employer shall be (i) "absolutely liable," or (2) "conclusively
presumed to be negligent." 9 A legislature could, therefore, without con-
travening the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, phrase an act so as to provide for a "conclusive presump-
tion of negligence against an employer" in proceedings under its
W. C. A. Under an elective act, however, as against an employer who
did not enlist, the action of an injured employee would still be based
upon negligence. To make the liabilities of both types of employers as
equal as possible under an elective act, the legislature might do away
with the necessity, or at least ease the burden, of the employee's prov-
ing negligence against a non-complying employer. To effectuate this
purpose an absolute liability or conclusive presumption of negligence
might be imposed upon the non-complying employer; or merely a
prima facie or rebuttable presumption of negligence might be used to
be inferred from the fact of the injury itself. By this means, the fact that
the workman was injured in the course of his employment would create
either a conclusive or prima facie presumption that such injury was
caused by the negligence of his employer. Such an enactment brings
into issue the extent of the power of a legislature to tamper with the
precepts of logic, and by fiat to declare that upon proof of one fact
another shall be inferred. Many cases have dealt with this legislative
right, and it is now well established that a state has the general power
to prescribe the evidence which shall be received and the effect that
shall be given to it in her courts. The state may exert this power by
providing that proof of one particular fact shall be prima fade evidence
of another. The only qualification upon this right is that the enactment
be not an arbitrary mandate or one that discriminates between differ-
ent persons in substantially the same situation; if this demand has been
met, the legislation will not create a denial of due process or equal
protection of the laws. 10 As was said in the leading case on statutory
"This would not be true had not the employer been already denied the com-
mon law defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary assumption of risk, and the
fellow servant rule.
"The leading case affirming this right is the United States Supreme Court
decision in Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136, 55
L. ed. 78 (igo). A Mississippi law provided that in all actions against railroads
for damages done to persons or property, proof of injury inflicted by the running
of locomotives or cars of such company should be prima facie evidence of the
want of reasonable skill and care on the part of the servants of such company.
NOTES
presumptions, Mobile J. & K. R. R. v. Turnipseed, it is "... only es-
sential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one
fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a pure-
ly arbitrary mandate."'1
Under the principles laid down in the Turn ipseed case, prima facie
presumptions have been upheld from one instance in which the fact of
recklessness was inferred from the fact of driving an auto ten m.p.h.
through a city street,12 to one in which violations of the city's garbage
ordinance were inferred in certain instances from the use of the city's
water supply.'3 A multitude of rebuttable inferences possessing varying
degrees of rationality have been sustained in attacks upon both civil'
4
This was upheld by the Court, which said: "The statute does not, therefore, deny
the equal protection of the law or otherwise fail in due process of law, because it
creates a presumption of liability, since its operation is only to supply an inference
of liability in the absence of other evidence contradicting such inference. That
a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute
a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law it is
only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof
of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. So
also it must not under the guise of regulating the presentation of evidence, oper-
ate to preclude the party from the right to present his defense to the main fact thus
presumed." 219 U. S. 35, 43, 31 S. Ct. 136, 138, 55 L. ed. 78 (191o).
11219 U. S. 35, 43, 31 S. Ct. 136, 138, 55 L. ed. 78 (gio).
12Morrison v. Flowers, 308 Ill. 189, 139 N. E. 10 (1923). A motor vehicle -act
provided that if the rate of speed through town on a public highway exceeded ten
miles per hour, such rate of speed should be prima facie evidence that the person
operating such motor vehicle was running at a rate of speed greater than was
reasonable and proper. This Illinois statute survived an attack based on the Four-
teenth Amendment.
lzState v. Spiller, 146 Wash. 18o, 262 Pac. 128 (1927). Under a city ordinance,
it was made mandatory that all who had garbage to dispose of should do so by
means of a certain type of garbage can prescribed. If the householder did not
possess such a can, the fact that he was using city water raised the prima facie pre-
sumption that he was creating garbage, and, therefore, violating the statute. This
statutory presumption was held not to be a violation of due process of law.
"'Cunningham v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 215 S. W. 5 (Mo. 1919) (delay by car-
rier creates presumption that the carrier was negligent); People v. Polthemus, 367
I11. 185, 1o N. E. (2d) 966 (1937) (presumption that transfer was made in con-
templation of death); Goldstein v. Maloney, 62 Fla. 198, 57 So. 342 (1911) (presump-
tion that a sale was fraudulent); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88, 48 S. Ct. 443, 72 L.
ed. 796 (1928) (insolvency at time of deposit is prima facie presumption that of-
ficer knew of insolvency and assented to the deposit); Commonwealth v. Kroger,
276 Ky. 20, 122 S. W. (2d) ioo6 (1938) (prima fade inference that a traffic violation
was committeed by or with the car owner's consent). Contra: Tipton v. Estill Ice
Co., 279 Ky. 793, 132 S. W. (2d) 347 (1939) (mere failure to secure an operator's
permit not prima facie evidence that the driver involved in the accident was neg-
ligent).
1941]
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and criminal 15 statutes, under the due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Federal Constitution.
Similarly, though less frequently, conclusive presumptions have
been enacted and have been upheld by the courts. In Packard v.
O'Neil'6 an Idaho statute created an absolute legal presumption of
negligence for personal injuries and property damage against a man
who drove a car while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The
court held that this presumption was created not as a principle of evi-
dence, but as a measure to insure and regulate safety upon the high-
ways. The legislature had thought that there might be difficulty in
establishing lack of due care, and that this would leave room for so
much question that the conclusive presumption of negligence ought
to prevail.
In many instances, however, legislatures have gone even further,
extending the class of injuries for which a defendant is absolutely
liable.17 Thus, railroads have been made absolutely liable for property
damage caused by sparks emitted from their engines, I8 and automobile
owners have been held to an absolute liability for injuries caused by
the negligence of operators driving with their consent.19
sHawes v. Georgia, 258 U. S. 1, 42 S. Ct. 204, 66 L. ed. 431 (1922) (prima facie
evidence that the person in actual possession had knowledge of a still on the
premises); Yee Hem v. U. S., 268 U. S. 178, 45 S. Ct. 470, 69 L. ed. 904 (1925)
(opium presumed to have been imported illegally); Bandini Petroleum Co. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 284 U. S. 8, 52 S. Ct. 103, 76 L. ed. 136 (193)
(the blowing, release, or escape of natural gas into the air prima facie evidence of
unreasonable waste); Cockrill v. California, 268 U. S. 258, 45 S. Ct. 490, 69 L. ed. 944
(1925) (presumption that a conveyance was made with intent to avoid escheat);
People v. Fitzgerald, 14 Cal. App. (2d) t8o, 58 P. (2d) 718 (1936), cert. denied, 299
U. S. 593, 57 S. Ct. 115, 81 L. ed. 437 (1937) (possessor of dynamite made prima face
guilty of a felony); State v. Nossaman, 107 Kan. 715, 193 Pac. 347 (1920) (posses-
sion of cigarettes prima facie evidence of the selling or keeping for sale); State v.
Elkin, 177 La. 427, 148 So. 668 (1933) (failure to pay worthless check in ten days
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud); State v. Fitzpatrick, 141 Wash. 638, 251
Pac. 875 (1927) (possession of burglary tools prima facie evidence of the intent to
use the same to commit crime). Contra: McFarland v. American Sugar CO., 244 U. S.
79, 39 S. Ct. 498, 6o L. ed. 899 (1916) (presumption of being a party to a monopoly
or a combination in restraint of trade or commerce held invalid); Stafford v. City
of Valdosta, 49 Ga. App. 243, 174 S. E. 81o (1934) (purchase of intoxicating liquors
within the city limits not to be presumed from mere possession).
1645 Idaho 427, 262 Pac. 881 (1927).
1In cases other than those involving W. C. A. controversies, this is going much
further because the common law defenses are still available to the defendant
under a conclusive presumption of negligence, while under liability without fault
they are immaterial.
"St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 S. Ct. 243, 41 L. ed. 61x (1897).
"Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 52 S. Ct. 144,
76 L. ed. 323 (1932). See also Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 18o, 184, 17 S. Ct. 282, 284,
NOTES
A review of the numerous cases in which statutory presumptions
have been upheld establishes the power of a legislature to declare that
upon proof of one fact another shall be inferred. With the view of
persuading non-complying employers to enlist under a V. C. A., legis-
latures have, in several instances, declared that the fact of the work-
man's being injured in the course of his employment shall be prima
facie evidence that such injury was caused by the negligence of the
employer. In Lykes Bro. S. S. Co. v. Esteves,20 a federal court consider-
ed a provision in the Puerto Rican W. C. A., creating a prima facie
presumption of negligence against an employer who had elected not to
come within the act, and the constitutionality of the provision was up-
held under a due process attack. The court reasoned that it was not
dealing with liability for negligence generally, but with a W. C. A.
confined entirely to industrial injuries, in which a jurisdiction if it
wished could impose absolute liability. It was observed that the em-
ployer could preclude resort by the employee to such action by secur-
ing accident compensation in accordance with the act, and the pre-
sumption was sanctioned as a constitutional means of coercion.
In Hawkins v. Bleakly21 a statute with a presumption to substanti-
ally the same effect was upheld under an equal protection attack. It
was held not to be arbitrary as it treated all employers alike and all em-
ployees alike. The fact that it served as a "strong inducement" to the
employer to come within the W. C. A. was again held not to be uncon-
stitutional coercion.
In the light of such precedent, it is surprising that the Pennsylvania
court in the decision of Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore22 reached the
opposite conclusion. There, the wording of the act creating the prima
4 L. ed. 677 (1897). Where an owner or tender of sheep, cows, etc., drove them
over a public highway constructed on a hillside, he was held to be absolutely
liable for all damages they did to the banks, etc. The Court held that "The
statute, being general in its application, embracing all persons under substantially
like circumstances, and not being an arbitrary exercise of power does not deny to
the defendant the equal protection of the laws." And "So, also, as the statute
clearly specifies the condition under which the presumption of neglect arises, and
provides for the ascertainment of liability by judicial proceedings .. .", that it was
not a taking of property without due process of law. In the opinion the Court ob-
served that the legislature had said, in effect, that such a passage was so likely, if
great caution was not observed, to result in damage to the road, that where this
damage followed such a driving, there ought to be no controversy over the exist-
ence or non-existence of negligence, but that there should be an absolute legal
presumption to that effect resulting from the fact of having driven the herd.
289 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1937).
2243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 6i L. ed. 678 (1917).
2334 Pa. 449, 7 A. (2d) 302 (1939)-
19411
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facie presumption against the non-complying employer was unusually
cautious, expressly providing for the right of the employer to introduce
testimony showing the irijury to have arisen from another cause, and
making the final determination a question of fact for the jury.23 This
provision was held to be in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
under both the due process and equal protection clauses.24 In failing to
recognize a "manifest connection between the fact proved and the fact
presumed," the decision not only ignored the fact that the courts have
not applied the highest degree of logic in the inferential step,25 but
completely turned its back on two rulings of federal courts to the con-
trary.26 Such a decision stands in need of support, for it is thought that
the somewhat limited authority on the issue goes to support state legis-
latures in creating a prima facie presumption of negligence against an
employer in an action by his employee for injuries received in the
course of employment.
On the question of the power of a legislature to create a conclusive
presumption in this regard, however, even less case authority is avail-
able. In 1923, a legislative effort to make a non-complying employer
liable without fault was sustained2 7 by the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Fahler v. City of Minot.28 In 194o, however, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in the decision of Prager v. W. H.
Chapman & Sons Co.,2 9 held that it violated the principle of due pro-
USection 210, 1 (a) of 77 Penn. Stat. § 42.
"The court also held the act invalid as contravening the Pennsylvania Bill of
Rights which declares that no person can "be deprived of his life, libexty, or prop-
erty, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." Pa. Const. Bill of
Rights Art. I, § 9.
2
State v. Nossaman, io7 Kan. 715, 193 Pac. 347 (1920) (rational connection be-
tween the possession of cigarettes and the sale of them or the keeping of them
for free distribution); Commonwealth v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 38, 122 S. W. (2d) ioo6
(1938) (violation of a traffic law had a rational connection with the inferred fact
that same was committed with the car owner's authority or permission); State v.
Spiller, 146 Wash. 18o, 262 Pac. 128 (1927) (use of the city's water made prima
facie evidence in certain situations of the violation of a garbage disposal ordin-
ance).
"Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 10, 37 S. Ct. 255, 61 L. ed. 678 (1917); Lykes
Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, 89 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1937). See notes 2o and 21,
supra.
"The North Dakota legislature had provided that a non-complying em-
ployer could be sued by a complying employee either before the administrative
tribunal or at his option before the courts of law. If he chose the latter he was
held to have the benefit of the conclusive presumption of negligence the same as
if he were before the tribunal. Laws of 1939, Ch. 162, § 11.
2849 N. D. 960, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
19 S. E. (2d) 88o (W. Va. 1940), noted (1940) 2 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 170.
NOTES
cess of law for the legislature to make non-complying employers liable
regardless of fault. The court believed the act to be unconstitutional
because the W. C. A. was not compulsory and had not, therefore, sought
to impose liability upon all employers. It was observed that the pro-
vision might have been intended to compel all employers to become
subscribers to the W. C. A., but that this fact did not make the act
effective, because if the legislature had that purpose in mind, there was
open to it a plain, simple, and direct way in the passage of a compulsory
W. C. A.30
The reasoning of this conclusion is not in line with precedent. It
must be remembered that conclusive presumptions applying to other
situations have been upheld,31 and that the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment are not contravened by legislation of this type if a rational
basis exists for the rule enacted.32 The true idea of due process of law
is that the processes of government shall not be exerted or imposed in
an arbitrary or capricious manner at the whim of some judge or execu-
tive, but rather in accordance with the letter and spirit of certain pre-
scribed rules or well established usages.33 Thus, unless there is a sub-
stantial invasion in a highhanded manner so as to represent unguided
or arbitrary action, the courts of the United States are reluctant to in-
terfere on the ground that a state has violated the due process clause;
and therefore, unless outstanding, matters of state procedure, in parti-
cular, are not subject to these attacks.
3 4
Upon an attack under the equal protection clause, also, there is a
a°Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 138 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489 (1911).
31Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. i8o, 17 S. Ct. 282, 41 L. ed. 677 (1897); Packard v..
O'Neil, 45 Idaho 127, 262 Pac. 881 (1927).
nMobile, J. & K. C. R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 31 S. Ct. 136, 55 L..
ed. 78 (1910).
"Bank of Columbia v. Okley, 4 Wheat. 235, 1 L. ed. 878 (U. S. 1819); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97 (19o8); Arizona Employers'
Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed. io58 (1918); see Truax v. Cor-
rigan, 257 U. S. 312, 329-30, 42 S. Ct. 124, 128, 66 L. ed. 254 (1921), 27 A. L. R_
375, 384 (1923), where the Court said: "It is true that no one has a vested right in
any particular rule of the common law, but it is also true that the legislative
power of a state can only be exerted in subordination to the fundamental princi-
ples of right and justice which the guaranty of due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment is intended to preserve, and that a purely arbitrary or capricious
exercise of that power whereby a wrongful and highly injurious invasion of prop-
erty rights, as here, is practically sanctioned and the owner stripped of all real'
remedy, is wholly at variance with those principles."
"Matson v. Dept. of Labor and Industries of Washington, 284 U. S. 55. 5- S..
Ct. 69, 76 L. ed. 214 (1934).
1941]
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presumption in favor of the classification3 5 made by the legislature,30
and of legitimate grounds for distinction.37 The one who assails a clas-
sification under the equal protection clause must, therefore, carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but
is essentially arbitrary.3 8
Upon these principles, accompanied by a recognition of the fact
that a legislature if it wishes may impose an absolute liability under
a compulsory statute, the decision of the North Dakota court39 allow-
ing liability without fault is to be preferred. The best reason that can
be given in support of this conclusion is that which underlies the very
public purpose justifying a compulsory W. C. A.-i.e., the realization
that there is a pecuniary loss resulting from these industrial injuries
which the employee should' not bear. The primary if not the legally
termed "proximate cause" of these injuries is the employment itself, and
in this adventure both the employer and the employee are engaged.
Compensation acts provide for reimbursement to the employee be-
cause it is on him that the first brunt of the loss falls. They further re-
quire that payment shall be made by the employer because he takes the
gross receipts of the common enterprise, and can, by reason of his con-
trol, make the proper adjustments to distribute the loss. 4 0 This is cer-
tainly a public policy of great worth.41
There is one obvious objection to a conclusive presumption in
these cases, however, that remains yet to be treated. It is one thing to
hold an employer liable for damages occurring without fault when the
damages are more or less limited by a prescribed scale (as under a W.
C. A.), and quite another to hold him liable for all the damages a jury
might assess. The latter allows the legislature to subject the non-com-
By classification is meant the fact that the legislature made the terms of the
act applicable only to a certain group or kind of cases rather than giving it uni-
versal application.
"Borden's Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 55 S. Ct. 187, 79 L.
ed. 281 (1934); N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 3oi U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct.
bi. 81 L. ed. 893 (1937).
'People v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548, 234 Pac. 398 (1925).
3Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. ed. 369
('91').
Fahler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 96o, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
4OBy insurance, by increasing selling prices, and by reducing wages. (But the
latter action is obviously not possible since the advent of large scale union con-
tracts).
"New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. ed. 662
(1917); Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 S. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed.
MV. (1918).
NOTES
plying employer to a jury assessment after stripping him of his com-
mon law defenses. A question of whether such an employer has been
afforded the equal protection of the law is, therefore, appropriately
raised. In Fabler v. City of Minzot 42 the court met this objection by
saying that where the employer did not come within the statute, the
claim of the injured employee was necessarily subject to the hazard of
the employer's financial responsibility and the delay and inconvenience
of a suit through the regular legal channels rather than the simplified
procedure before a Workmen's Compensation Bureau. This seems a
fair exchange, and with this objection also erased, there can be no
further logical basis for a Fourteenth Amendment attack upon a con-.
clusive presumption of this type. Any remaining discriminations must
be accepted. The whole basis upon which a W. C. A. is conceived is
that there is an adequate distinction between the employer class and
the employee class.
43
Finally, all the employer has to do if he finds the role of a non-
complier too burdensome is to subscribe to the act, the power to adopt
these means of coercion being recognized.
4 4
C. Liberalization of Rules of Admissibility of Evidence
Under an elective statute, when a workman is suing a non-comply;-
ing employer, there are several things that he must prove if he would
take advantage of the statutes abolishing the common law defenses of
his employer. In such a case, the workman must prove that the injury
'249 N. D. 96o, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
"aThis may be admitted, but still the question asked whether there is any
adequate basis of distinction between an employer who elects to come within the
act and one who does not? It seems that the courts have long recognized this dis-
tinction when they have denied the common law defenses to the latter class. In
Fahler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 96o, 194 N. W. 695 (1923), the court answered
this question further by pointing out that the employee was forced to submit to
the inconvience of a law suit and the danger that his employer would be insol-
vent.
"Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 37 S. Ct. 255, 61 L. ed. 678 (1917); Lykes
Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, 89 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). In Ferry v. Ramsey,
277 U. S. 88, 94, 48 S. Ct. 443, 444, 72 L. ed. 796 (1928), a Kansas act provided that
the fact that a banking institution was insolvent or in a failing condition at the
time of the reception of a deposit should be prima facie evidence that the director
or officer had knowledge and had assented to such deposit. The Court held that the
legislature might have made the director personally liable to the depositors in
every case if it had wished, and thereby have made one taking the position assume
the risk. The Court said: "The statute in short imposed a liability that was less
than might have been imposed, and that being so, the thing to be considered is the
result reached, not the possibly inartificial or clumsy way or reaching it." See also
Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, 89 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1937).
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was the result of his employer's negligence; that it was sustained "in the
course of his employment"-i.e., occurred while he was on his job; that
is was sustained "out of the course of his employment"-i.e., occurred
as a consequence of his employmeni; a 5 and that it resulted in certain
damages to him. To facilitate the proof of these issues by the work-
man, a legislature might make evidence which was prohibited at com-
mon law admissible in the proof of these points.
In the only instance in which this has been attempted the statute
,was declared void in the Pennsylvania case of Rich Hill Coal Co. v.
lBashore.46 To supplement a provision creating a presumption of neg-
ligence, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a further enactment that
anything the injured employee said to anybody within twelve hours
after the injury would be adjudged "competent evidence" in any action
brought to recover damages for personal injuries against a non-com-
plying employer. This was the construction put upon the following
statute by the highest court of the state:
"When an employee sustains an injury in the course of his
employment, declarations, remarks, and utterances, made by the
injured employee within twelve hours after the injury was
sustained shall be admissible as competent evidence." 47
The court held this provision to deny to the non-complying em-
ployer the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.48 In reaching this conclusion the court regarded the act as hav-
ing the effect of creating a conclusive presumption of negligence and
therefore to be invalid for the same reason that a direct attempt to
create that result would have been.4 9 If this were the only ground for
'3See Harper, Law of Torts (1933) § 212.
48334 Pa. 449, 7 A. (2d) 302 (1939)-
'"Section 201.1 (b) of 77 Penn. Stat. § 42-this provision being applicable only
in respect to employers who had elected not to come within the scope of the act.
"SThe court found two other grounds of unconstitutionality: (1) the act con-
travened the principle that the rules of evidence must be uniform and impartial,
(2) it was "special legislation" and therefore invalid under a provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution that the legislature "shall not pass any local or special
law ... regulating the ... rules of evidence in, any judicial proceeding or inquiry
before courts .. " Pa. Const. Art III, § 7.
"9While recognizing the logical distinction between making a fact conclusive
proof of a fact in issue and making an unsworn utterance of an injured employee
"competent evidence," the court thought that the "practical effect" of the latter was
to make a finding of the employer's fault almost inevitable from the mere fact of
the employee's injury. The basis of this reasoning was that in most injuries of this
type the only witness was the employee himself and thus the rule would make
the employer's right of rebuttal practically valueless. This would put the employer
in the same position as if the legislature had made the mere fact of the injury
conclusive proof of the employer's fault.
NOTES
holding the act invalid, the decision of the court would be very doubt-
ful, for it has been seen that the right to create conclusive presumptions
in workmen's compensation cases has been affirmed by other courts.
The court, however, found several other faults. The employee might
use these statements even though he survived the injury and was able to
appear on the witness stand.50 The employee might make willfully
false statements within the twelve hour period51 to third persons. Such
remarks could be testified to by these third persons, who would not in
testifying stand in danger of being prosecuted for perjury, which danger
would face the workman if he were to testify falsely himself. Thus, the
employee could absent himself from the jurisdiction,52 and establish his
case by these witnesses. Cross examination of such witnesses upon this
hearing would not be effective, 53 because their knowledge would be
limited in most instances to the content of the employee's own state-
ments. The declarations made would, furthermore, not have to relate
to the injury, but could be prejudicial remarks on irrelevant mat-
ters.54 The court held these ex parte declarations to be unacceptable
as evidence for four reasons: (i) they did not have to be made under
oath; (2) they were not part of the res gestae; (3) they did not need
to be made under the solemnity of impending death; (4) they were not
subject to cross examination.
The statute does seem to present an imposing array of irregularities,
and there is no doubt that as a general rule of evidence, it would be
open to serious objections. It must be remembered, however, that it is
"'A witness is not allowed to testify as to an unsworn statement made by him-
self upon a former occasion. A declaration of a witness out of court inconsistent
with his testimony is not admissible to prove the truth of the facts stated, but only
for purposes of impeachment. Spear v. United Railroads of San Francisco, 16 Cal.
App. 637, 117 Pac. 956 (1911); Backes v. Movsovich, 82 N. J. L. 44, 81 Ad. 497 (1911);
Southwestern T. & T. Co. v. Thompson, 157 S. W. 1185 (Tex. Civ. App. 193).
"Which the court observed was ample time for the designing of testimony.
rC"Hearsay evidence does not become admissible by reason of the fact that
the declarant has left the jurisdiction or is sick or cannot be examined or compelled
to testify or is incompetent as a witness." 22 C. J. 217.
r-The court held cross-examination to be more than a privilege-that it was
a right.
5 This construction seems not only unnecessary, but to be unrepresentative of
the usual treatment of a court passing on the constitutionality of a statute. A court
will, if possible, put a construction upon a statute that will make it possible to
hold the act constitutional. If the court had construed the act so that the only
remarks available would have been remarks relevant to the issue-that is, have
made the rule of "relevancy, competency, and materiality" paramount to the im-
plications of the legislative enactment-it could have avoided this objection, at
least.
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confined to cases of a particular type, and will serve only as an aid on
certain particular issues in suits of that type. It might be well, there-
fore, to analyze the act as it would apply to the several proofs that a
workman must establish in a suit against a non-complying employer.55
It will be noticed that the act opens with the words "when a workman
is injured in the course of his employment." It is a possible construc-
tion that the legislature intended that before the rule of evidence under
review is to be available to the employee, he must first establish that he
was injured "in the course of his employment"- which term in Penn-
sylvania also embraces the requirements of the usual "out of the course
of employment" phrase.56 Under such an interpretation, evidence of
the type made admissible by the statute could not be used by the em-
ployee to show that he was injured in or out of the course of his em-
ployment.57 Perhaps a more common construction would be that the
evidence is to be admissible on any issue in the case, including whether
the injury happened in or out of the course of the employment. Under
this interpretation, the act would be open to serious objection, as it
would be a threat to extend an employer's liability to all cases in
which his employee was injured, whether on the job or not. As a means
of avoiding an unnecessary invalidation of the statute, the court might
well have adopted the former construction, even though it may not be
the most obvious meaning of the words used by the legislature.
As to this "radical" rule of evidence being available to prove dam-
ages received, it is hard to see how the act in any way prejudices the
5As set out, supra, these points are: (i) that the injury was caused by the em-
ployer's negligence; (2) that it was sustained in the course of the employment; (3)
that it was sustained out of the course of the employment; (4) and that it resulted
in certain damages to the employee.
6'Pennsylvania is a state that has eliminated the customary "out of the course
of the employment" requisite. Thus the term "in the course of the employment"
is usually deemed to embrace both concepts. For a discussion of this point and the
general distinction between "in the course of" and "out of the course of", see
Harper, Law of Torts ('933) § 212.
5'On the issue of whether the injury was "accidential" or not as it is customar-
ily used in a W. C. A. an interesting point is raised. When a W. C. A. requires
that an injury be accidental it means that it shall not be caused by the attempt of
the workman to commit suicide or wilfully to inflict injury upon himself or an-
other person. This, however, only applies to suits against workers under the W. C.
A. As to suits against non-complying employers, which suits are common law
actions, such an issue would not come up because it would ordinarily arise under
the defense of contributory negligence, and this defense has been taken from non-
complying employers. It will be noticed that the Pennsylvania act read "When in-
jury results .. " It did not require it to be an accidental injury as it would have
had to be under the W. C. A.
NOTES
employer. Statements of general pain and suffering constitute a recog-
nized exception to the hearsay rule and are thus admissible without the
aid of a statute.58 It is difficult to conceive of any other kinds of state-
ments that the employee might make within twelve hours after his in-
jury that could be used effectively to establish damages that did not
in fact exist. Of course very abusive statements about the employer
might be introduced to incite the jury's general prejudice against him,
but still the employer would have available the usual sources of ob-
jective proof regarding the extent of the employee's injuries. If the
award of the jury exceeded to any substantial extent the injuries re-
ceived, the verdict could be set aside upon this ground.
The mere fact that the evidence is admissible, moreover, does not
mean that it will be credible. If the plaintiff is in court, cross-examina-
tion is available to disprove the truth of his statements; and if he is
not at the trial, it is likely that his very absence would raise serious
doubts in the jurors' minds as to the validity of the evidence. If an in-
jured workman with designs on undeserved economic gain remarked
within the period that he had received everything from a fractured
skull to a lacerated little toe, that he anticipated a nervous breakdown
and life long ill-health as a result, he might absent himself from the
jurisdiction and use these remarks to establish his damages. However,
he could hardly remove the attending doctors, the ambulance drivers,
and the hospital nurses from the jurisdiction and destroy doctors' and
hospital records as well. It is for these reasons that the rule of evidence
seems harmless as far as any chance of increasing the amount of dam-
ages is concerned.
This leaves only one other matter in which the rule of evidence may
be thought to facilitate the proof: the question of the negligence of the
employer. But it has been seen that a legislature has the right to create
a W. C. A. that imposes absolute liability,59 as well as an act that
creates an absolute presumption of negligence against a non-complying
employer. 60 This, then, is a return to the old issue of whether the legis-
lature can do indirectly what it has the right to do directly. That is, if
the legislature has the power to create an absolute presumption of neg-
ligence against a non-complying employer, can it not create a rule that
operates to enable the presentation of merely a strong case of negligence
"'See Wigmore, Evidence (1940) § 1718.
"'State ex rel Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 177 Pac. 11o (19"), 37
L. R. A. (N. s.) 466 (1912).
O'Fahler v. City of Minot, 49 N. D. 96o, 194 N. W. 695 (1923).
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against a non-complying employer? The thing to be considered is the
result reached, not the possibly artificial or clumsy way of reaching it.61
When the operation of the particular rule of evidence under review
is analyzed, it is difficult to see upon what ground the Pennsylvania
court could have held it to be violative of the principles of the equal
protection clause. The theory of workmen's compensation is based
upon the assumption that there is a sufficient basis of distinction be-
tween employer and employee. The cases upholding the denying of
common law defenses and the imposing of the presumptions of neg-
ligence established the view that there is a valid basis of distinction be-
tween enlisted and unenlisted employers.
The court said, however, that this rule of evidence was denied to
the defendant employer, and considered that the legislature was there-
by opening the door of "loose hearsay testimony" for the benefit of one
party, while keeping it closed to the other. It is doubtful whether there
are any evils implicit in this situation. True, the rule relates to re-
marks made by the employee only, and not to remarks made by the
employer, but the justification for this discrimination rests upon the
very nature of the relief being afforded as well as the nature of the em-
ployment relationship which has long been recognized as the basis of
aW.C.A.
The rules of hearsay have been meddled with before by the legis-
latures. It is a well-known rule of common law evidence that what is
hearsay does not cease to be so because the person who made the re-
mark may have died.6 2 In situations like this, however, statutory
changes in two states have admitted the statements of decedents as ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule.6 Although. involved in numerous cases,
these statutes have apparently never been questioned under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Moreover, cases have held that the admis-
sion of incompetent evidence is not a denial of due process of law.65
Statutes making a writing or memorandum of any kind, whether made
in the regular course of business or not, admissible evidence may be
found, and have been held not to violate the principles of due process
6Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U. S. 88, 48 S. Ct. 443, 72 L. ed. (1928), see note
44, supra.
"Updike v. Mace, 194 Fed. iooi (S. D. N. Y. 1912); Rulofson v. Billings, 140 Cal.
452, 74 Pac. 35 (19o3); Griffin v. Train, go App. Div. 16, 85 N. Y. Supp. 686 (19o4).
mSee Wood v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 87 Conn. 341, 87 At. 983 (1913);
Crosby v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 221 Mass. 461, log N. E. 365 (1915).
"See cases collected in 22 C. J. 216.
"State v. Owens, 124 S. C. 220, 117 S. E. 536 (1922); State v. Thorson, 202 Wis.
31, 231 N. W. 155 (1930).
NOTES
of law.66 This is an analgous situation to the rule under discussion, and
the chances for fraud and deceit are as great in the memorandum cases
as in the oral remark cases. When it is considered that the memoran-
dum statutes are statutes of general application and the statute under
review is one confined only to a particular type of action which is
created to effectuate a great public purpose, it seems that the Pennsyl-
vania court became unduly alarmed about the efficacy of this rule of
evidence as an agency for the forces of evil.
67
A look into the way the common law rules of evidence have been
relaxed with an increasing degree of liberality in administrative pro-
creedings before workmen's compensation boards further strengthens
the argument against the Pennsylvania decision. Many statutes pro-
vide that the commission shall not be bound by the common law or
statutory rules of evidence. In at least two states great liberality exists
in that the courts may not reverse a finding because of any informality
in the manner of taking evidence.68 Thus, either as a result of express
statutory command or by construction of statutes relaxing the rules
of evidence, hearsay may be admitted and considered by the commis-
sions in several states.6 9 When it is seen that employers who have ac-
cepted a W. C. A. are subjected to these relaxed rules of evidence in a
proceeding before a commission, is it such a discrimination to subject
a non-complying employer to the same "ordal" before a court of
law?7 0 As long as a rule of evidence is available only in aid of finding
of an employer's negligence, it should not be considered objectionable
in the constitutional sense. Should it be so drawn as to facilitate proof
nGile v. Hudnutt, 279 Mich. 358, 272 N. W. 7o6 (1937) upheld a Michigan act
of this type. See also Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N. Y. 124, 170 N. E. 517 (1930).
nConversely, legislative attemps in the opposite direction, in the way of ex-
cluding testimony admissible at common law, have been made. In the recent case
of Kirsch v. Posimal, 294 N. W. 865 (Wis. i94o), a statute provided that no state-
ment made by an irjured person within seventy-two hours after receiving an ac-
cident or injury should be received in evidence in an action for damages for per-
sonal injuries unless the same should be admissible as part of the res gestae. The
constitutionality of this statute has not been questioned under either due process
or equal protection clauses.
"Cal. Labor Code (Deering, 1937) § 57o9; Mont. Rev. Ann. (Choate, Supp.
1935) § 2938.
"Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 175, 269
Pac. 1127 (1938); Baker v. Industrial Comm., 44 Ohio App. 539, 186 N. E. 1o (1933);
see Note, (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 576.
7'The point is arguable, however, that such a relaxation of rules might be
permitted before commissioners experienced in the evaluation of testimony, but
that a jury might not be equally fortified against the deceptions of hearsay testi-
mony.
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on other issues, such as that the workman was injured in the course of
his employment, then its constitutionality might be questioned.
Conclusion
It should be remembered that workmen's compensation legislation,
made to equalize the liabilities of the two types of employers and to
persuade the non-complying employer to enlist under the act, is not
dealing with injured plaintiffs in general, but only with plaintiffs who
are employees injured in the course of their employment by the neg-
ligence of their employer. These are pieces of legislation with great
public purpose behind them. The object of all these acts is to create a
liability against the employer for a certain class of injuries regardless
of his fault. If an employer chooses not to come within the W C. A.,
an attempt to aid a workman in proving the employer negligent is in
order. Abolition of common law defenses, imposition of presumptions
of negligence and regulations of the admissibility of evidence are proper
if exercised in this direction, and in this direction only. They are not,
furthermore, to be considered as unconstitutional means of coercion
when their only efficacy is in the carrying out of this purpose.
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